with the parties and approved the merger. Under the settlement, the airlines 8 agreed to divert gates and slots (take-off and landing rights) at seven major airports. After these mergers, the United States domestic market contains four 9 large airlines, each holding a share between fourteen and twenty percent of the domestic air travel market. (Because AirTran only held about a 3.5% market 10 share, the Southwest/AirTran merger does not raise market-concentration issues similar to those of the other three mergers).
The airline industry shows a four-firm national concentration level based on airline passenger miles of about seventy percent while four-firm concentration based on the shares of all domestic ticketed passengers is close to eighty percent. Although the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for airlines passenger 11 miles of 1489.3 indicates an un-concentrated market, there is general agreement that national concentration levels, however calculated, are of secondary importance. City-pair market concentration far better reflects the market power 12 of the carriers, and this is the focus of official attention. Mergers have 13 eliminated competition between the merger participants, and many city-pair markets have much higher concentration ratios and HHI levels than the industry as a whole. The government's complaint in the American/US Air merger, for 12. See id. The index is a measure of industry concentration used in the merger guidelines of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 35. The index is calculated by squaring the percentage market share of each firm in the industry and adding them. Id. Therefore, the maximum possible value of a monopoly is 10,000 (100 ). Id. at 36. Because the HHI 2 is constructed from the squares of market shares, it yields a higher number as shares are larger on average and also as the shares are more unequal.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-515, AIRLINE COMPETITION: THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMPETITORS IN MARKETS SERVING THE MAJORITY OF PASSENGERS HAS CHANGED LITTLE IN RECENT YEARS, BUT STAKEHOLDERS VOICE CONCERNS ABOUT COMPETITION 9 (2015).
14. Morton et al., supra note 11, at 36.
determinants of consumer demand, competitive behavior in the industry, the 22 23 importance of politically-controlled complementary inputs, and general antitrust 24 activity in the industry.
I. THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY: HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS

A. From Regulation to Deregulation
After four decades of regulation during which airline fares and routes were subject to the control of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Congress opted to deregulate the airline industry in 1979. Prior to deregulation, the industry was 16. Morton et al. supra note 11, at 36. For example, an HHI of 2500 in a city-pair market could mean that it is being served by four equal-sized airlines, and a market with an HHI of above 4000 could mean that it is being served by three airlines of somewhat unequal size.
17. were gone by 1990.
33
Since deregulation, descriptions of the industry's structure have typically distinguished the so-called "legacy" carriers, those carriers that were operating before deregulation, from "low cost" carriers (LCCs) that began operating in the post-regulation period. Although the term LCC is very widely used, it carries 34 two different connotations. One is that the latecomers have not been burdened with high labor costs generated or facilitated by regulation, which continued into the post-regulation period. The post-regulation entrants paid wages much closer 35 to prevailing labor market conditions and made them low-(or lower-) cost operations compared with their older rivals. The other connotation is that the 36 newcomers offer a rather Spartan product and can charge lower prices on that count alone. The two characteristics have typically gone together, but they 37 should be distinguished.
A popular image long held the largest carriers were the legacies and that the low-cost carriers tended to be relatively small. This is no longer a true compete with Southwest and the three legacy carriers on many routes.
B. Financial Performance and Bankruptcies
Along with the prevalence of mergers, the industry has been distinguished by its dismal financial performance since the onset of deregulation. In 2011, Stephen Dempsey summarized the industry financial experience, stating that by the end of 1991, the industry had lost all the profit that it had previously earned plus another $2 billion. It would recover in the late 1990s, and then lose it again 46 in the early twenty-first century, suffering losses in every year but one 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 As shown by the large number of unprofitable years noted, the airline industry operates in a highly volatile environment. Borenstein and Rose have argued that uncertainty about the right business model has typically led each carrier to engage in considerable expansion in good times only to suffer subsequent losses in downturns. Demand is growing secularly, but it drops 51 significantly during periods of recession or when a threat of terrorism arises, and unpredictable fuel cost changes and labor unrest add to uncertainly. Thus the 52 periods in which the industry incurred losses include the recessionary periods at the beginning of the 1980s, the similar period at the beginning of the 1990s, the period after the dot-com bubble, the period following the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the period of the so-called ' There are two major approaches linking large fixed costs to industry profitability. Under the first approach, the adverse impact of fixed costs on profitability results from industry overcapacity. This is inconvenient for the 57 airlines, but is self-correcting over the long run: Over time, the airlines will reduce their capacity, bringing it in line with the scope of their operations and restoring their profitability. Indeed, that is the way competitive markets adjust 58 capacity to demand.
The second approach assumes the airline industry to be one of a few industries that are structurally prone to so-called "destructive competition," an 59 affliction in which affected industries are said to operate for prolonged periods at a loss. Economic theories about destructive competition usually identify the 60 affected industries as characterized by high-fixed costs and easy entry. In fact, 61 the avoidance of destructive competition was the rationale under which regulation was initially imposed on the trucking industry in 1935 and on the airline industry in 1938. Current versions of the destructive competition approach make use of 62 "core" theory: In a market of many sellers, high fixed costs, low marginal costs, and perishable (or non-storable) product, efficiency sometimes depends on cooperation among the players. industries whose capital consists of intellectual property, such as the pharmaceutical and software industries are also characterized by high fixed costs. These industries all rely on the market to adjust capacity to demand. 66 Borenstein has suggested an explanation for poor industry performance that involves fixed costs, but one that takes account of interaction with other characteristics of the industry. He argues that since regulation, there has been 67 a great lack of certainty about viable business plans-a situation that has led to an emphasis on route expansion and overinvestment when times are good. This, 68 combined with the instability of both demand and fuel cost, explains much of the varying but dismal profit performance of the industry. It is not necessary to 69 criticize management's investment decisions to explain the industry's losses when the explanation is a temporary shrinkage of demand. The industry's investment in aircraft gives it the potential of earning enormous profits, as demonstrated in the current post-recessionary period. Management's investment decisions will 70 be proven prescient or inadvisable by their long-term market effects.
2. Other Aspects of Industry Cost Structure.-Air travel has generated a rich literature on the determinants of costs. This has been made possible by copious data collection and reporting practices, much of it required by federal regulation, and has made U.S. airlines perhaps the most empirically studied industry in history. One major determinant of cost is the price of fuel, which has historically varied over time between eleven and thirty percent of total airline costs. The pattern of flights and plane changes has also been a source of cost saving. Borenstein cites the development of the hub-and-spoke system as one of the great, unanticipated developments of the post-regulation airline world. All of the 84 legacy and many of the LCC carriers have found that considerable savings can be achieved by routing passengers through selected airports and combining them for flight continuation. The development of small regional jet aircraft 85 accelerated this practice. The hub-and-spoke network is a major example of economies of density, achieved through consolidating operations.
86
E. Network Demand Effects
Network effects is another industry characteristic that has been emphasized in recent discussions of public policy towards mergers in the industry, and its significance will be explored later in this Article. The airline industry and other 87 transportation industries-like the telephone and other communications industries and also the software industry-generate network effects. In airlines, as in many other networks, there are "demand side economies of scale [that] arise whenever, as a network grows, it provides more than a proportional increase in its value to consumers." As noted, the hub-and-spoke structure of the legacy carriers 88 generates network effects and is the source of significant efficiencies.
89
F. Overall Demand
Although the demand for air travel has risen greatly over time as rising incomes have confronted stable or falling real prices-U.S. travel measured by revenue passenger miles quadrupled between 1978 and the turn of the twenty-first century, but demand has also varied with the business cycle, and from other shocks, already noted.
90
The industry has always understood that business travelers have far more inelastic demand than does the rest of the travelling public ("leisure") travelers.
91
The industry has exploited these differences in demand by the practice of offering higher-priced (e.g. business class) seating and lower-priced seating; and by 82. Borenstein 
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varying the ticket prices with the day of the week and the time of day; and also varying them as the time before takeoff approaches. Indeed, the airlines exploit 92 differing demands, much as utilities impose different charges to business customers than to residential customers. 93 We have noted the hub-and-spoke structure's effect on reducing cost through economies of density. Now we consider the impact of the hub-and-spoke 94 structure on demand. From its earliest development the hub-and-spoke system has created both costs and benefits for those based near hub airports. From a 95 passenger's perspective, the greater choice of times and destinations (enhancing consumer welfare) has had to be set against the price premium that traditionally has attached to hub dominance (lowering consumer welfare), although that 96 premium has declined substantially over recent years as result of LCC competition bolstered by computerized price shopping. Passengers, however, continue to show a marked preference for the airline offering the most service from an airport, holding all other characteristics of a flight constant. Besides the 97 attractiveness of the service, this is also due to the successful use of marketing techniques, especially frequent flyer programs offering free tickets or other amenities, that introduce non-linear pricing into a purchaser's calculation and 98 can create a principal-agent conflict for business travelers who may put personal benefit ahead of company savings. Loyalty discounts also exist for corporate 99 purchasers based not on the volume of purchasing, but rather on the percentage of the firm's total air travel budget that is devoted to a certain airline. Cutting 98. In linear pricing, a purchaser pays a total amount for a purchase that is determined by price times quantity; any other pricing is nonlinear. either sometimes or always use computer-assisted price comparisons before booking. In short, the airline industry shows a full range of demand effects, 102 pricing behavior, and customer responses that would be expected in imperfectly competitive markets.
G. How Do Airlines Compete?
At the time of deregulation, many economists tended to view competition in the airline industry through the lens of William Baumol's theory of contestable markets. Under this theory, an industry behaves competitively if entry and exit 103 into the market are costless. The airline industry was seen as a contestable-104 market paradigm.
It was relatively costless to move an aircraft from one 105 location to another. Therefore, when any airline was able to raise its profits 106 beyond a competitive return, those profits would attract entry that would compete them away. Because entry and exit were effectively costless, market power and sustained supracompetitive returns were impossible in the airline industry.
107
In fact, entry and exit are not costless; new airline entrants must incur a set of pre-operating and "ramp-up" costs that are sunk (that is, nonrecoverable) in the event that the entrant leaves the market. The inapplicability of contestability As noted previously, Borenstein concluded that constant experimentation with business models was one of the prime causes of industry profit instability and negative overall profit levels. This implies that the airlines have been uncertain about the strategies of their rivals, and this uncertainty would impede the tacit cooperation that would facilitate oligopoly pricing. Borenstein also concludes that overinvestment in good times in the quest for route expansion has played an important role in industry losses. The unprecedentedly high level of Williams found that gate control at congested airports is a key element of the hub price premium.
148
I. Government Supervision of Mergers and Competition
From deregulation in 1978, supervision over airline mergers initially remained in the CAB. The end of the CAB came on January 1, 1985, with 149 supervision over airline mergers passing to the DOT where it remained until the end of 1988. Congress divested the DOT's antitrust authority over airline 150 industry mergers and gave it to the DOJ in hopes of greater enforcement against anticompetitive airline mergers.
The DOT, however, retained authority 
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prohibit anti-competitive behavior beyond the reach of the Sherman and Clayton Acts under section five of the FTCA, the DOT asserts power to prohibit such 154 behavior beyond the reach of the Sherman and Clayton Acts under section 411. It asserts that power despite Congress having explicitly transferred its enforcement authority under section seven of the Clayton Act to the DOJ.
II. THREE PHASES OF ANTITRUST ACTIVITY
A. The Market Magic Phase
The theory of market contestability, already noted, provided part of the impetus for the 1978 deregulation and much of the related intellectual atmosphere for the next several years. The optimism of the deregulators matched that of 155 entrepreneurs. Entry was dramatic but often short-lived. Although there were about a dozen each long distance and local jet carriers at the dawn of deregulation, forty-seven entrants joined them by 1984. Of those that entered, 156 only seven were still operating in 1990. Another cycle of entry arose in the 157 mid-1990s when eighteen new carriers entered, but once again, most of the entrants ultimately disappeared. These recurring cycles of entry and exit are 158 consistent with the volatility of the airline passenger market.
Contestability as an assurance of competitive behavior turns on three crucial assumptions: New firms have the same technology, prices, costs, and information as incumbents; there are zero sunk costs; and the lag between incumbent knowledge of entry and entrant's new supply is less than the lag of price response by incumbent firms. In the airline industry, some new carriers often had lower 159 costs than the incumbents, which have traditionally been saddled with high labor costs due largely to union entrenchment under regulation.
The other two 160 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:539 conditions also raise doubts about the relevance of the approach: Sunk costs may be low but they are not negligible, and incumbents will know of entry long enough in advance to mount an immediate response upon entry. The most successful entrant, Southwest, misses the contestability paradigm entirely. It maintained a considerably lower cost of production than the legacy carriers until recently. It developed a reputation for a dependable and high quality, if 161 somewhat Spartan product. Southwest also avoided head-on attacks against the legacies, preferring an approach of attrition. In doing the latter, it discouraged 162 predatory price attacks. Southwest's impact on markets, where it was thought likely to enter, is consistent with "limit pricing," a much older model of pricing than contestability. Throughout this whole period-before, during, and after the high tide of belief in airline-market contestability-Alfred Kahn, the father of deregulation, maintained a strong belief in vigorous antitrust enforcement. Kahn did not view fourteen mergers over the period in question, one such study found price increases by the merging firms on affected routes of 9.44% relative to unaffected routes. Other firms on these routes saw an increase of over twelve percent.
168 169
This result was consistent with increasing concentration leading to a higher level of recognized mutual dependence. On the issue of predatory behavior, the DOT eventually moved in Kahn's direction, proposing its own policies to counter predatory or predatory-like behavior of major carriers.
170
B. The Vigorous Antitrust Phase
There were few mergers approved over the following twenty years, and those that were usually "involved at least one airline that was in extreme financial distress." The DOJ opposed the proposed acquisition of US Airways by United, 171 announced in 1999, and it was withdrawn because: (1) both carriers had hubs in the W ashington D.C. area, which would monopolize service to some cities; (2) they dominated several hub-hub markets; (3) they were two of the three main airlines serving small Northeast cities, and the merger would significantly increase concentration in eastern cities; and (4) competition would be reduced on several transatlantic markets. The DOJ later contrasted its negative judgment 172 on this transaction with its approval of America West/US Air merger. The latter 173 was described as a geographic "barbell," (i.e., largely non-overlapping networks) that was held up as "an example of the kinds of mergers that may easily avoid antitrust problems."
174
What of Fred Kahn's other concern: predatory behavior? The basic rules of that analysis are set out in the Supreme Court's 1993 Brooke Group decision.
175
The Brooke Group predation standard requires sales below an appropriate contest mergers, which led to increased airfare), http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/ehkim/articles/ mergersmarkets-aer1993. Beginning in the 1988s, the airlines began a generally uncontroversial practice of codesharing, which increased the ease with which a passenger could move across a route involving more than one airline. The passenger need get only one ticket to travel with two carriers. This involved an agreement between carriers that assigned with sale of the entire ticket by one airline at a price that it determined, while the other carrier was reimbursed at estimated operating cost. The practice appeared to eliminate the usual inefficient double marginalization of vertical arm's length sales without the need for integration.
175 problems of applying previous standards to airline competition became immediately apparent. The court attempted, as far as possible, to follow the 179 scheme established in Brooke Group: establishing that (1) the incumbent would have market power without the additional competition provided by the LCCs, (2) American engaged in pricing below some appropriate measure of its costs, and (3) there was a "dangerous probability" of subsequent recoupment of losses incurred during the predatory period. American Airlines lowered its prices to 180 match those of the LCCs, claiming that these price reductions were simply meeting the competition. Although the DOJ argued that American's increased 181 capacity on the contested routes greatly diluted demand for the newcomers' similarly priced product-a Section 2 violation, independent of predatory pricing-the courts did not accept the argument. Continuing complaints by would-be successful entrants into the industry as well as consumer groups about predation towards start-ups generated attention by the DOT, which issued a proposed approach to predation tailored especially to the airline industry based on a legal framework different from the one developed by the courts.
The DOT proposal simply ignored prevailing precedent (most 194 notably Brooke Group), bypassing consideration of the price/cost relation entirely. Instead the test would simply be whether a capacity expansion costs 195 the dominant firm (1) more revenue than the entrant would have diverted from it or (2) more than the result of either matching the entrant's fares or establishing the same relative fares as with better established entrants elsewhere. Although 196 the DOT's proposal was based on its authority under section 411 to prevent unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition, it did not fare well.
197
Congress responded to the Department's proposal by mandating a study by the National Council's Transportation Research Board (TRB) which failed to endorse the DOT's policy. A GAO report describing the DOT's proposal noted that 198 several airlines had criticized the proposal's language as vague, and that the DOT court also decided the issue rather than remand it, "[a] trial was unlikely to elicit much evidence not already in the extensive summary judgment record" and would only "delay the inevitable" the DOT decided to address predatory behavior in fact-specific adjudications under section 411. 200 In the comments on the DOT proposal, the major airlines argued that it was proper for them to match an entrant's low fares on a large number of seats, a 201 proposition rejected by the DOT. The major airline position also describes the behavior of American in the suit brought by the DOJ, where American matched the fares of Vanguard, Western Pacific, and Sunjet on routes out of Dallas-Fort Worth and added seating capacity. The major airlines' position thus appears to 202 be based upon the Supreme Court's Brooke Group opinion, read as condemning predatory pricing defined as below-cost pricing combined with a likelihood of recoupment and as accepting the lawfulness of pricing and related behaviors that do not fall within that definition. The airlines' reading of Brooke Group may 203 also be supported by the Court's assertion in that case that evaluating pricing above a relevant measure of cost may be "beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate pricecutting." In American Airlines, the government failed to show that American's 204 incremental revenues on the flights in question fell below either its average variable cost or its average avoidable cost. The government-DOT and the 205 DOJ-had been searching for an alternative to a strict reading of Brooke Group. It has found limited support among scholars but not in the courts or 206 elsewhere. 207 Overall, the government was left in a quandary in the early years of this century. The DOT was unable to implement its new approach to predation, and the DOJ was unable to persuade the court that capacity additions could be treated as predatory behavior, or establish below-cost pricing under the classic Brooke
2017] U.S. AIRLINES AND ANTITRUST 563
Group standards.
208
C. The Recent Merger Approvals
As noted earlier, the post-2008 crisis period has seen four major mergers approved by the DOJ, producing a significant cumulative increase in concentration. In a recent merger (American/US Air) the DOJ's brief listed 460 209 city-pair markets which the guidelines would treat as presumptively unlawful on concentration grounds.
It is important, therefore, to examine the DOJ's 210 approach to these mergers and the rationales that it employed in approving them. How is it that the DOJ initially sought to enjoin the American/US Air merger but subsequently approved it? Given the troubled financial history of the airline industry, this Article first examines the failing firm doctrine to ascertain whether that doctrine offers any basis for the merger approvals. The Article concludes that it does not. This Act. In fact, reorganization under Chapter 11 is common in the airline industry 219 where such reorganizations have enabled legacy carriers to cancel or modify labor contracts and thereby to reduce their labor costs. So Chapter 11 was clearly 220 available to the merging airlines and many of the merging parties had recently used it. The merging firms thus did not meet the preconditions for using the failing-firm defense.
2. Potential Competition.-One seemingly obvious objection to the merger of two airlines, even where route overlap is not substantial, turns on potential competition.
That is, how likely is it that, in the absence of the merger 221 undergoing review, one merger partner would choose to enter a city-pair market to compete with the other merger partner? In none of the merger evaluations 222 did the DOJ consider the potential competition that one of the merger partners posed for the other, absent the merger. In 2005, an Antitrust Division official described its merger enforcement approach to the airline industry as:
Reviewing any particular merger, we first identify the city pairs in which the merging carriers both provide service. It also may be appropriate to consider markets in which the two both are likely to provide service in the future, such that today they are 'potential' competitors. 223 How the likelihood of entry would be evaluated goes unstated. Nevertheless, despite the varying strengths of the firms involved in the recent mergers, all were in some sense national firms with at least some potential to increase their presence in geographic areas in which they were relatively weak.
224
Discussion of mergers between firms that might become direct competitors has changed across the various versions of the Merger Guidelines. The 1984 Merger Guidelines treated mergers involving potential competitors as nonhorizontal mergers, which were distinguished from vertical and horizontal mergers.
Under the 1984 Merger Guidelines, mergers involving potential 225 competitors were analyzed under headings of harm to "actual potential competition" and to "perceived potential competition." Both involved likely 226 entrants but with a different focus: The former involved a merger of a likely entrant with an incumbent firm that eliminated the entry and thus eliminated the de-concentration effect of entry; while the latter eliminated the downward pressure on price that can be exerted by likely entry and hence limit pricing by the current market participants. Of course, a merger that deconcentrates a market necessarily involves at least one company that at the time of the merger is in a horizontal and competitive relationship to market participants. And a merger involving a company that exerts downward pressure on market prices necessarily is similarly in a horizontal and competitive relationship to the market participants.
It would be an apt use of language to describe the firms in these horizontal relationships as competitors. The 2010 Merger Guidelines treat potential competition as a horizontal merger problem, thus, employing a broader approach to horizontal competition than its 1984 and 1992 predecessors. In its opening 227 sentence these guidelines state its reach as extending to "mergers and acquisitions involving actual or potential competitors." 
233
A very detailed discussion of the Delta/Northwest merger by Mark Israel, Bryan Keating, Daniel Rubinfeld, and Robert Willig never considers Delta or Northwest as potential competitors to each other on routes they were not already serving (even perhaps to dismiss its probability), while the DOJ's Competitive Impact Statement of the American Airlines/US Air merger similarly completely ignores such competitive concerns while stressing that divested gates and slots as part of the agreed settlement "would expand the presence of potentially disruptive competitors at these strategically important airports." The original 234 complaint filed uses the phrase "actual and potential" competition, to attack the 235 merger, but the "potential" part is never discussed. Rather, the key to the Department's approach may lie in the network effects generated by these mergers.
3. Network Effects and Efficiencies.-The first of the recent mergers, Delta/Northwest, is the best documented. In that case, the merging parties 236 formalized a defense that appears to have been accepted to some extent by the government in all three. In evaluating the Delta/Northwest merger, the DOJ 237 accepted and used ideas about both the value to passengers of network effects and the cost saving to the airlines of effectuating them. For consumers, these effects 238 may save trip time, provide a greater density of flights, and allow convenience of scheduling between points or simply allow the traveler to stay with a preferred airline. Whatever the reason, network effects raise the benefit of a product or service to consumers and can be regarded as an increase in quality. Just like any enhancement of quality, they make the product or service more desirable and raise the willingness to pay. Quality improvements that immediately benefit purchasers have always counted positively in merger analysis and are explicitly The Delta/Northwest merger differed from the two that followed because the approval did not require the firms to give up any gates or slots. Approval rested on an increase in consumer valuation of likely changes by the two merging parties on the apparent assumption that they were not imminently likely to engage in more competitive behavior towards each other. The settlement did not necessitate any quid pro quo to increase competition in the market. In contrast, both of the other approved mergers involved the enhancement of access by LCCs to "constrained airports." The proposed remedy will require the divestiture of almost four times as many slots as were divested at the time of the United/Continental merger, plus gates and additional facilities at key airports throughout the country. In total, the divestitures will significantly strengthen the purchasing carriers, provide the incentive and ability for those carriers to invest in new capacity, and position them to provide more meaningful competition The original complaint against the American/US Air merger devoted much space to the competition provided to the other legacy carriers by US Air, which DOJ argued engaged in more price competition than other legacy carriers (through its "Advantage Fares" on connecting flights) because its hubs were less advantageously placed. But DOJ may have decided that it could achieve both 271 higher quality service and the possibility of increased price competition by approving the merger. A similar calculation may have underlain the approval of United/Continental: In each case the loss of possibly largely ineffective competition was sacrificed for the more promising price-reduction policy of encouraging the LCCs along with some increased product quality and cost saving.
D. An Interpretation: How DOJ's Merger Evaluations in the Airline Industry Differ from Its Normal Merger Evaluations
Prices are the focus of routine merger evaluation. The analysis begins with 272 the Department's assessment of the relevant market, using a hypothetical monopolist framework set forth in the guidelines. The idea is to equate the 273 relevant market for merger evaluation with the geographic and product space in which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price. Post-merger entry is cognizable only if it 274 is sufficient to restore price to pre-merger levels within a limited period. In 275 airline mergers this exclusive focus on price and price effects has been replaced by a broader and more encompassing inquiry. Several factors explain this broader analytical approach. First, the price effects of the recent airline mergers, based on an extensive body of econometric research, were expected to be small. These minimal price effects may be partially explained by competition from the LCCs. It may also be due to the fact that the airlines have already maximized their pricing power as Brueckner has suggested. These two possible explanations are not inconsistent and both may 276 play a role.
Note that a city-pair market composed of three carriers would minimally have an HHI of over 3000 and would be defined by the merger guidelines as a highly concentrated market. could explain the DOJ's apparent exemption of the airline industry from the normal presumption of illegality that the guidelines attach to high concentration. Although the guidelines state that the SSNIP "is not a tolerance level for price increases resulting from a merger," the DOJ has apparently tolerated some 281 price increases in that amount because the likely price increases (in the recent mergers under review) were more than offset by quality-related consumer benefits. This brings us to network effects as the source of consumer benefits. As pointed out above, the hub-and-spoke organization of the large airlines was a largely unanticipated cost-saving device having demand-side as well as supplyside ramifications.
This organizational economy benefited consumers by 282 lowering their costs of traveling between many cities. Mergers between 283 airlines, whose networks are in substantial part non-overlapping, add to consumer convenience by enabling consumers to use a larger (merger-enhanced) network without changing airlines. In routine merger analysis, the merger partners do 284 not normally generate network effects, so there is no corresponding consumer benefit to evaluate. This, then, makes the evaluation of airline mergers again different from normal merger evaluation. In airline mergers, the antitrust analysis cannot focus exclusively on price effects, but must also take account of these quality enhancements when they are present, because they are part of standard consumer welfare analysis. It appears that the DOJ did just that, and concluded 285 that the price effects of each of these mergers were offset by the quality effects generated by combining networks. In addition, in two of the recent mergers (United/Continental and American/US Air), the DOJ conditioned approval upon the merger partners transferring significant numbers of gates or landing slots to Southwest, JetBlue, or other LCCs. This could be viewed as a frontal attack on a series of antitrust 286 bottlenecks. Because gates and slots are necessary for the LCC to compete and they are in short supply at a number of major airports, their transfer to LLCs creates the conditions in which LLC competition at these airports can be The required gate and slot transfers bear an analytical similarity to the now disfavored essential facilities doctrine. That doctrine (in most of its variations) 288 requires an owner of a facility needed to compete to share with rivals when it is impossible or impractical for them to duplicate it. Where gates and slots are in short supply in a number of airports, they take on a role analytically similar to the role played by the terminal facilities. They are limited in number and the merger participants in both mergers controlled critical numbers of gates and slots, reinforcing their market power and impeding competition from LCCs. The 289 airport situation, however, takes a somewhat different form. In the airport cases, there is a public regulator (the DOT and the local airport authorities) of a fixed or nearly fixed essential facility that is used to capacity. Of these public regulators, only the DOT is able to regulate gate and slot allocations beyond the confines of a single airport. Although the DOJ has succeeded the DOT as 290 merger enforcer, the DOT retains at least some authority over competition issues under section 411. Competition would be furthered if the DOT allotted the gates and slots in the public interest. So stated, this problem resembles Trinko, where 291 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, determined that the problem-access by rivals to elements of the telephone network controlled by Verizon-was a regulatory one within the cognizance of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and not within the domain of antitrust. Verizon could be 292 read as indicating the allocation of gates and slots is a matter for the DOT. In the merger cases under review, the DOJ has used its jurisdiction over mergers to preempt any attempt by the DOT to address the allocation of gates and slots. 293 In context, this aggressive use of antitrust by the DOJ appears fully justified: The DOJ is well within its authority to take competitive conditions into account in settlements; and its actions are likely to further the congressional purpose of enhanced antitrust enforcement underlying the transfer of enforcement authority over mergers from the DOT to the DOJ.
As a condition for approving the United/Continental merger, the DOJ Ten of these slots were already leased to Southwest, but the final judgment awards them permanently to Southwest. The remaining twenty-four slots will 299 be awarded to carriers approved by the DOJ. The merger approval conditions 300 also require the divestiture to airlines approved by the DOJ of two gates at each of the following cities: Chicago (O'Hare), Los Angeles, Boston, Miami, and Dallas.
301
Slot and gate divestitures aim to stimulate competition in the context of the particular structure of the U.S. airline industry. The DOJ's strategy is apparently based on a recognition that price competition is unlikely among the legacy carriers whose marketing practices are interdependent. Instead, its strategy relies on the LCCs to generate price competition. So far, the LCCs have operated with different incentives and business plans than have the legacies, and the LCCs pricing policies have diverged significantly from the legacy carriers, generating a strong downwards pressure on prices.
302
In approving the American/US Air merger, the DOJ countenanced the elimination of the US Air's Advantage Fare program, a program under which US Air undercut legacy nonstop fares on US Air flights requiring a stop. This was 303 a major objection to the merger in the original complaint, but the concern was 304 ultimately shelved. Why? The DOJ may well have thought that the Advantage Fare program contributed less to price competition than would the new LCC competition that would emerge because of the slot and gate transfers that were part of the settlement.
In summary, the LCCs played a critical role in the approval of the last two In addition, the mandated gate and slot transfers were keyed to opening markets to substantially increase that competition. Actual and anticipated price 306 competition from the LCCs allowed the estimated value of enhanced quality from the mergers to outweigh estimated price effects.
307
E. Apparent Merger Results So Far
Since the mergers, the airline industry has recovered from the effects of the recession, and the industry is earning record profits. This profitability extends 308 to all three of the merged legacy carriers. This resurgent demand has at least 309 temporarily solved the financial problems that have plagued the industry in the past. Is there evidence that the DOJ's use of network-generated consumer surplus as a tool of merger evaluation generates sound policy?
Any indication of increased demand from network effects alone based on market share changes would be highly tentative, given that the data are completely uncontrolled, especially for prices and the fact that airline network changes were overlapping and management changes from mergers often create temporary difficulties. Nevertheless, the Delta/Northwest merger may have generated some effects that are indicative of the quality enhancement. Although both firms stumbled in the year prior to the merger, the combination resulted in an immediate, sustained, and considerable expansion of share, in conformity with the model in Figure 1 . Figure 1 .
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